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THE ADOPTION OF AGRICULTURAL CREDIT COOPERATIVISM IN SPAIN 
(1890-1935): SOLIDARTY FROM BELOW?  
 
Abstract.  
The spread of agrarian credit cooperativism in Spain (1890-1934) was done under a 
variety of ideological and economic orientations. This article focuses on the 
construction of a few tools and indicators to explain the characteristics of agricultural 
credit cooperatives. An analysis of financial operations of rural savings banks is related 
with socio-political aspects that influenced their development; This analysis helps us to 
explain the relative success of German credit cooperative models adopted in the context 
of Spanish agriculture, as happened on European periphery. 
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THE ADOPTION OF AGRICULTURAL CREDIT COOPERATIVISM IN SPAIN 
(1890-1935): SOLIDARTY FROM BELOW?  
 
0.- INTRODUCTION 
 
The success of credit cooperatives in Germany after 1850 was one of the key factors 
contributing to their spread across Europe. Throughout the 1880's they consolidated and 
organized solidly in the greater part of northwestern countries2, to the point of 
becoming one of the most effective responses to the formation of small farms amidst the 
end-of-century crisis. One of the most widely accepted theses explaining the successful 
implementation of the German models emphasizes the additional advantages offered 
compared to traditional banking systems in terms of greater availability of information 
about potential clients, thus an enhanced ability to offer financial products closer to real 
demand and at a lower cost. The broad hypothesis can be tested in Germany not only 
because of the existence of a developed banking system, but also because of precedents 
in rural financing from large landowners tracing back to the seventeenth century. Credit 
cooperatives triumphed in France, the Netherlands3 and northern Italy4, but not in 
Denmark5 or Ireland6. Nor did they prove to be an effective instrument to address the 
pressing agricultural modernization in the Mediterranean regions of Europe. 
 The objective of this paper is to analyze the difficulties that these kinds of 
cooperatives had in establishing themselves in Spain, especially those in achieving 
significant levels of sustainability, efficiency, stability and coverage; such difficulties 
hindered cooperatives from becoming a useful instrument for the development of a rural 
finance system that could have circumvented the financial exclusion experienced by 
broad segments of the rural populations in Spain. 
Secondly, in the section "The implementation of agricultural credit 
cooperativism in Spain: 1890-1934” a study is conducted on the introduction of 
agricultural credit cooperatives in Spain between 1890 and 1934, analyzing the spread 
of models offered by the first cooperatives to achieve their sustainability and which 
factors impeded the further development of such entities.  The study also attempts to 
explain the causes leading to the establishment of associations, delimiting the spatial 
extent of their establishment. To analyze the factors conditioning their growth, we have 
used a microanalysis of banks (typology of members, operations, resources, financial 
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technologies, etc.), and we have constructed various indicators showing the credit 
cooperative density in Spain. 
The third section discusses the financial functioning of this kind of cooperative, 
attending to various indicators, such as credit demand, information and transaction 
costs, the seasonality of client operations subject to the harvest cycle, risk uncertainties, 
the lack of real guarantees from members, etc.. In this sense, the section attempts to 
explain how rural savings banks addressed these problems and exogenous risks (that do 
not depend on clientele, but rather on institutional context) and to outline an explanation 
of their success or failure. 
Finally, we consider a comparative study between these rural microcredit 
institutions and pósitos7, which coincided both spatially and temporally, dealing with 
the same potential clientele. 
In this paper we use the term "rural finance" to refer to the provision of financial 
services to a heterogeneous group of agricultural and non-agricultural population at 
different income levels. It covers a variety of formal, informal or semi-formal 
institutional settings, as well as diverse types of products and services including loans, 
savings deposits, insurance, purchase of inputs and machinery, etc.. The term 
encompasses both agricultural finance and rural microfinance, and it constitutes a sub-
sector of the broad financial sector. This definition follows the line marked by the trend 
known as the "New Paradigm of Rural Finances"8. This trend in economic thought 
referring to rural finance considers rural populations as eligible for banking services 
from efficient institutions. Among the objectives of rural financial institutions are the 
maximization of coverage and the attainment of sustainability in order to achieve the 
greatest possible impact on the rural population. These goals are achieved through 
projects carried out in different types of institutions, products, services and processes 
that arise in response to the barriers of information, incentives and contractual 
obligations that make financial transactions difficult in rural areas. We analyze the 
member-owned institutions: savings and credit cooperatives and the influences 
exercised over them by second-level financial institutions (federations, head offices, 
confederations, etc.). 
In addition to clarifying the definitions, we note that any historical analysis of 
credit cooperativism entails taking into account the essential characteristics of the very 
agriculture in which it unfolds, as well as the positions of farmers toward such social 
economic institutions9. 
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 I. THE IMPLEMENTATION OF AGRICULTURAL CREDIT 
COOPERATIVISM IN SPAIN: 1890-1934 
 
Agricultural credit cooperativism arose in the changing context of agriculture 
and the evolution of farming in mid-nineteenth century Germany (Raiffeissen, Schulze-
Delizsch and Haas systems), and from there it spread throughout Europe. In its origins 
this movement sought to curb the effects of market forces that tended to eliminate those 
producers more vulnerable to competition. 
The first spread of agricultural microcredit systems, and more specifically the 
rural savings banks of the Raiffeisen system (Caja Rural10), are connected with Joaquin 
Diaz Rábago11, though this propagandist did not generate any practical initiative, 
despite being a director of the Santiago de Compostela branch of the Bank of Spain and 
his political relations with the liberal leader Eugenio Montero Rios. 
The first adaptation of the Raiffeisen cooperatives in Spain was made in 1891 by 
Nicholas Fontes Alvarez de Toledo in Murcia, with the assimilation of the 
Darlehnskassen with self-help groups. He founded the Caja Rural de Ahorros, 
Préstamos y Socorros of Javalí Viejo12, guided by the institutional model made by the 
German Catholic Center of Westphalia (Association of Westphalian Farmers). The 
Fontes model spread widely through Murcian farming towns. Its fundamental purpose 
was to prevent the conflict between tenant-laborers and landowners, in so halting the 
spread of socialist and anarchist ideas. By 1898 they had been implanted in 8 towns, 
with 2,350 members altogether and by 1900 Cajas Rurales Fontes (Fontes Rural 
Savings Banks) had been founded in the provinces near Albacete (Chinchilla, Pétrola, 
Fuanteálamo, Corral-Rubio, Bonete y Tobarra), Granada, Alicante, Badajoz and 
Málaga.  
The target clientele consisted in poor farmers (small tenants, small-scale 
landowners and laborers) so as to enable them to acquire land. This was accomplished 
through a unique system involving the parcel’s acquisition by the institution, which 
established a ten-year contract with the interested member who was then obligated to 
pay one tenth of the value each year plus 5% of the outstanding capital. The financial 
institutions also acted to avoid the forceful commercialization of their silk cocoon-
producing members, buying their products and selling them at better prices in the most 
convenient markets. Despite having been contemporaries, there was no contact between 
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Diaz de Rábago and Nicholas Fontes. The absence of a cohesive information network 
remained a constant among the first microcredit theorists and the first practices in 
Spain. 
In the early years of the twentieth century, several models of rural finance 
institutions were in incipient stages of formation in various points around Spain. In 
1902 Luis Chaves Arias13 founded different cajas rurales in the region of Castilla-
León. The same model was used by the priests Anacleto Orejón, Gregory Amor and 
Valentin Gómez to found another rural savings bank in Amusco in 1901 (Palencia)14. 
In the face of social change and consequent conflict unfolding in the agricultural 
sphere, the Spanish Catholic Church, and more specifically its organs of social policy, 
developed a number of distinct initiatives to hinder the most disadvantaged groups from 
joining the new political and union organizations that questioned the existing social and 
economic order. 
In the same vein, the development of finance institutions for small family-farms 
was essential to preventing their disappearance amidst agricultural markets swings. 
Social Catholicism considered the Raiffeisen model of cooperatives to be a useful tool 
in the implementation of its social and economic policies. For this reason the publicity 
activity of Luis Chaves was supported by the Catholic organization and had a 
considerable impact upon the adoption of his model of credit cooperatives by the 
Confederación Nacional Católica Agraria (National Catholic Agrarian Confederation) 
(CNCA) for its rural savings banks and their unions. 
The Raiffeisen model enjoyed its greatest success in Navarra. Athanasius 
Mutuarría15 founded the Caja Agrícola de Tafalla (Agricultural Bank of Tafalla) 
between 1903 and 1904, followed by the Caja de Ahorros y Préstamos de Olite (Olite 
Savings and Loan Bank) founded by Victoriano Flamarique in 1904. Between 1904-
1907, the priests V. Flamarique and Antonino Yoldi launched an active propaganda 
campaign through the towns of Navarra, founding various rural savings banks16 (Table 
1). It should be pointed out that the success of this initiative rested in the support 
received from local clergy, the bishop and, in some cases, large landowners. One of the 
keys to the consolidation of cooperative banks in Navarra was the creation of a 
Diocesan Council and the development of a project with organizational coordination at 
three levels (local bank, district bank, and provincial bank) by A. Yoldi. The existence 
of second-level organs differed with respect to what occurred in other regions, where 
institutional structures did not exceed the first local step. In 1908 there were already 130 
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rural savings banks covering 346 towns with more than 14,000 member families, the 
cluster of which shared connections with 57 agricultural unions uniting 5,600 members. 
Cooperatives in Navarra became pioneers in the spread of chemical fertilizers through 
group purchases, strengthening their acceptance among small farmers in the region; in 
1910 more than half of the municipalities in Navarra (143 of 269) had a rural savings 
bank, and an umbrella organization for this network arose in the same year with the 
founding of the Federación Católico-Social de Navarra (Social Catholic Federation of 
Navarra), which was the country’s strongest core of Raiffeisenism at this early stage. 
 
TABLE 1.  ADOPTION OF DENOMINATIONAL AND RAIFFEISEN 
COOPERATIVISM IN NAVARRA, 1907-1910. 
1907 1908 1909 1910 
Town Rural savings 
banks 
Grouped 
towns 
Rural savings 
banks 
Grouped 
towns 
Rural savings 
banks 
Grouped 
towns 
Rural savings 
banks 
Grouped 
towns 
Aoiz 12  37 144 31 129 40 157 
Estella 22  42 96 44 93 49 96 
Pamplona 12  26 77 25 129 29 135 
Tafalla 13  19 23 19 23 19 23 
Tudela 4  6 6 6 6 6 6 
Total  63  130 346 125 380 143 417 
Town Agricultural Unions 
Grouped 
towns 
Agricultural 
Unions 
Grouped 
towns 
Agricultural 
Unions 
Grouped 
towns 
Agricultural 
Unions 
Grouped 
towns 
Aoiz 9 44   17 103   
Estella 15 42   18 98   
Pamplona 13 45   18 91   
Tafalla     2 2   
Tudela         
Total  37 130 57 250 55 294 57 250 
Source: YOLDI, A.: Sexta Semana Social, 1916, quoted in MAJUELO GIL, E.; PASCUAL BONIS, A.: Del catolicismo agrario al 
cooperativismo empresarial. Setenta y cinco años de la Federación de Cooperativas navarras 1910-1985, Madrid, p. 48 
 
Another important core of credit cooperatives with a "neutral"17 character 
emerged in Extremadura18, particularly in Badajoz, driven by Tomás Marín (director of 
the Badajoz branch of the Bank of Spain), who founded various rural savings banks in 
1905 (Fuente de Cantos and Cabeza de Buey), which agreed to unlimited liability and 
the exclusion of dividends, but allowed entrance quotas and monthly fees, which 
distanced them from the purity of the Raiffeisen system. These banks did not limit 
themselves to acting as savings and loans institutions, but also carried out their own 
operations similar to those of agricultural unions (purchase of machinery, breeding 
animals, seeds, chemical fertilizers, joint storage and sale of crops, rural nurseries, 
insurance and consolidation), although financial operations were the focus of their 
work. Such rural financial institutions were not linked to the Catholic organizations, but 
were an initiative of large and medium-sized agricultural land-owners who provided 
large amounts of capital stock, such that they became the rural savings banks with the 
highest capitalization in Spain throughout the period (1890 -1934). From the outset they 
7 
 
utilized the newest financial technology (techniques, procedures and financial products), 
such as savings accounts with guaranteed mortgages, which turned into their main form 
of credit. 
The high solvency and endorsements collected by institutions of Badajoz 
granted them the support of the Bank of Spain, such that they were able to obtain more 
central bank loans than any other federation; the Bank of Spain normally lent capital at 
interest rates ranging from 5.5 to 7%, while Badajoz institutions obtained money at 
4.50% with the guarantee of their members (Table 2). 
 
TABLE 2. INITIAL DEVELOPMENT OF RURAL SAVINGS BANKS OF THE 
RAIFFEISEN SYSTEM IN THE PROVINCE OF BADAJOZ, 1906-1911. 
 
 1906 1907 1908 1909 1910 1911 
Number of rural savings banks 9 14 20 24 24 24 
Grouped towns 24 40 49 63 63 63 
Number of members 1.519 3.012 4.582 5.739 5.941 5.974 
Capital stock (pesetas) 40.245.106 84.478.784 134.483.480 157.064.788 161.349.675 161.933.220 
Personal 332.037 834.594 1.199.438 1.343.681 1.354.887 1.415.621 
Secured loans  24.945 143.364 203.063 180.829 219.591 
Mortgages 717.167 2.530.441 4.591.627 6.395.530 7.173.575 6.943.098 Lo
an
s 
(p
es
et
as
) 
Total 1.049.244 3.389.980 5.934.429 7.942.274 8.709.291 8.578.310 
Share public funds (ptas).   141.370 434.060 716.056 829.350 
Balance of rural savings banks (ptas) 59.200 760.477 1.720.026 2.817.165 4.089.173 4.417.732 
Loans received from Bank of Spain (ptas) 1.323.510 3.090.429 4.326.019 5.556.346 5.183.813 4.815.992 
Reserves (ptas) 11.033 72.941 158.254 222.909 308.540 389.105 
Source: Asociación de Agricultores de España  Memoria del Segundo Concurso de Asociaciones Agrícolas, Madrid, 1911. 
 
Excluding the Extremadura group, in 1909 the number of organized rural 
denominational banks reached 37319 across Spain. Most of these banks introduced 
modifications to the original structure of the Raiffeisen model, adding to them the 
functions of savings banks, which required small contributions of capital stock (the 
norm was 10 pesetas in installments). The absence of legal regulation favoring the 
introduction of these credit cooperatives hindered their development until the passing of 
the Ley de Sindicatos Agrícolas (Agricultural Unions Act) in 1906 and its subsequent 
regulation in 1908. This legislation, influenced by the French Agricultural Unions Act 
of 1884, defined the concept of an "agricultural union" as an association of farmers 
(owners and growers). Such organizations could serve as combined agricultural 
cooperatives (production, marketing, purchase of inputs, credit, etc..) or they could 
simply have a specific credit section or found a dependant credit cooperative (rural 
savings bank). The law also allowed for the independent functioning of agricultural 
credit cooperatives by the name of cajas rurales, which are the object of study in this 
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paper. The tax exemptions provided by these regulations were systematically hampered 
from the Ministerio de Hacienda (Ministry of the Treasury) and especially from the 
Dirección General del Timbre (General Directorate of the Mint)20. This fiscal policy 
increased the cost of rural savings bank operations, thereby contributing to the 
sustainability difficulties they encountered. (TABLE 3). 
 
CHART 1. THE EVOLUTION OF DENOMINATIONAL COOPERATIVISM 1904-
1909 
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Source: JIMÉNEZ, I.: “Los sindicatos agrícolas” y “Las cajas rurales 
católicas”, en La Paz Social, (Madrid) 1909, pp. 169 y 241. 1908 (junio) y 
1908b (diciembre) 
 
In 1910 rural savings banks, according to a report by the Ministry of Public 
Works21, were present in the center of the country, especially in Aragon (23.9% of all 
existing banks), Navarra (23.4%), Castilla-León (15.3%) and Extremadura (14.9%); 
these regions concentrated 82.9% of all existing banks at that time. Many of these first 
credit bodies were very short-lived, and even most of those that persisted led very 
limited economic courses. 
 
I.1. Difficulties for the development of agricultural credit cooperativism: rural 
savings banks between 1915 and 1934 
 
  Serious social conflict in the countryside, resulting from the effects of World 
War I on agricultural markets, prompted the government to address the shortcomings of 
the 1906 Act (Legislation of 1908) so as to increase the effectiveness of tax exemptions 
on operations transacted by agricultural unions. These measures formed part of a 
political strategy that considered cooperativism to be a cornerstone in the promotion of 
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"social harmony" in the countryside. These new conditions, coupled with increased 
support from large and medium landowners to cooperatives, favored the proliferation of 
such institutions, whose numbers passed from 1,754 in 1916 to 5,821 in 192622. This 
support came about because agricultural landowners found economic advantages in the 
commercial credit provided by agricultural unions (purchase of inputs, acquisition of 
machinery, etc.). Agricultural credit cooperatives (cajas rurales) also benefited from 
these tax exemptions, which decreased the cost of credit operations for their members. 
Nonetheless, the number of these and related entities remained stable between 1915 and 
1934. 
The scarce success in the expansion of entities specializing in agricultural 
microloans is accounted for by various interrelated factors. Landowners were often not 
interested in becoming credit cooperative members because they were able to obtain 
agricultural credit from alternative sources; in fact some unions were able to offer 
commercial credit at a low cost. This situation worked to distance rural savings banks 
from some potential clients and members who would have ensured institutional 
sustainability by providing greater capitalization and guarantee options to obtain 
external financing. The case of Catholic agricultural cooperatives in Murcia 
corroborates this hypothesis23. Catholic agricultural unions developed an important 
business network (exportation, manufacturing, inputs, etc.) that attracted landowners, 
while rural savings banks failed to attract this type of clientele due to their high level of 
commitment (unlimited liability), aside from only providing limited financial services 
that did not cover their farming needs. 
The number of credit cooperatives remained stable between 1915-1934 at 
around 500 entities and 50,000 member farmers. The 1933 statistics by the Directorate 
General of Agriculture show an increase of 28.9% in the number of entities and 182.8% 
in the number of associate farmers compared with 1924. This period produced the 
consolidation of rural savings banks among the rural population. This increase owes to 
the further development of credit sections within agricultural unions and to 
methodological modifications in the 1933 statistics, which recorded the credit sections 
of agricultural unions directly as rural savings banks; this is reflected in the broad 
tabulation of both the number of institutions and members. Improvement in the 
functioning of credit cooperatives came about simultaneously, which became visible in 
their ability to attract savings and in the increase in lent capital. The evolution of the 
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deposits and loans in the group of the 57 largest rural savings banks confirms these 
improvements between 1924 and 193324. 
This macro analysis can be further refined to analyze the spatial distribution of 
rural savings banks. The maps (Figure 1) show the most important centers by the 
number of rural savings banks to be the regions of Navarra, Castilla-León and Cataluña, 
with secondary centers in Extremadura, Aragón, Asturias and Castilla-La Mancha. The 
maps indicate that the spatial presence, referring to the number of cooperatives displays 
a series of constants for the period: 1) areas of strong presence such as the 
Mediterranean Arc, stretching from Gerona to Murcia; Navarra, Asturias and some 
provinces of Castilla-León; 2) an area of semi-presence consisting in Extremadura, 
Cantabria, the western provinces of Castilla-León and the Balearic Islands; 3) and 
finally areas of low intensity such as Andalucía, Galicia and Castilla-La Mancha. 
This institutional presence (number of cooperatives) must be clarified by crossing with 
other variables, such as the number of members, the active agricultural population, 
agricultural production and agricultural credit25. 
 
 
 
FIGURE 1 ESTABLISHMENT OF RURAL SAVINGS AND LOAN BANKS 1910 
-1934 
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ESTABLISHED RURAL SAVINGS BANKS, 1910
ESTABLISHED RURAL SAVINGS BANKS, 1934ESTABLISHED RURAL SAVINGS BANKS, 1923
ESTABLISHED RURAL SAVINGS BANKS, 1918
 
 
Source: Anuario Estadístico de España 1915; 1916; 1924, Madrid; and DIRECCIÓN GENERAL DE AGRICULTURA: Acción 
social. Memoria descriptivo-estadística social agraria de las entidades agrícolas y pecuarias en 1º de enero de 1918, Madrid; 
Censo estadístico de Sindicatos Agrícolas y Comunidades de Labradores, Madrid, 1934. 
 
 This spatial breakdown produces a biased display of the distribution because of 
its merely institutional character, as it only contains the absolute number of 
denominational agricultural credit associations in each region, without taking into 
account their weight with respect to other important factors, such as agricultural 
workforce. To construct the ratio of "cooperative density" we use the following 
variables: total active agrarian population (TP), agricultural landowners (AL), 
population associated with credit cooperatives (membership) (AC) and agricultural 
laborers (AW). The population data come from the 1920 Census, and the number of 
members has been calculated from the Directorate General of Agriculture and Forestry 
(1927). The combination of these variables yields some ratios that, transferred to maps, 
allow a more adjusted assessment of the incorporation of agricultural credit 
cooperatives in Spain26. 
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FIGURE 2. RATIOS OF CREDIT COOPERATIVE DENSITY 1926 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Censo de la Población de España  1920, Madrid; and DIRECCIÓN GENERAL DE 
AGRICULTURA: Acción social. Memoria descriptivo-estadística social agraria de las entidades agrícolas y 
pecuarias en 1º de enero de 1926, Madrid. 
 
The first map of Figure 2 represents the credit cooperative ratio respective to the 
active agricultural population in the country. It shows how the provinces with the 
highest density are grouped in the northern part of the country in the northeast direction, 
highlighting the provinces of Navarra and Tarragona, with other concentrations in 
Zaragoza and Soria; the importance of the province of Badajoz deserves to be pointed 
out. This map does not offer very precise information, given that farm laborers were not 
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highly represented in the ranks of cooperative membership; hence the density of 
cooperativism displayed is blurred. 
The second map in Figure 2 displays the credit cooperative ratio with respect to 
agricultural landholders; it is a more refined indicator than the previous map, given that 
owners made up the core membership of rural savings banks, particularly medium and 
small landholders. In this case, we note that the highest cooperative concentration 
occurs in fewer provinces, highlighting Navarra, Álava, Tarragona, Balearic Islands, the 
line connecting Segovia, Soria and Zaragoza, Badajoz and Murcia. The large group of 
provinces whose production centered on cereal cultivation and extensive agriculture 
displays low cooperative densities. The high density responds to distinct agricultural 
models, such as that of Navarra, which displays the strength of the medium and small 
landowners who produced food for the large urban centers in the Basque Country, i.e. 
their production has a clear market orientation. 
This was similarly the case with the cooperatives in Tarragona, whose 
production catered the metropolitan and industrial area of Barcelona. In Murcia 
cooperatives grouped together small owners and orchard tenants, producing citrus fruit 
destined for European markets. The axis Segovia-Soria-Zaragoza, with a lower density 
than the previous two, consisted primarily in owners dedicated to grain production, and 
their cooperatives had lower capitalizations than the previous two, and thus a lower 
incidence of member financing. Badajoz is an exception to the two previous cases 
because its cooperatives gathered medium and large landowners who provided their 
financial institutions with high capitalizations. In 1911, the 24 existing cooperatives in 
Badajoz had a total capital of 162 million pesetas, which was higher than any other 
province (Asociación de Agricultores de España, 1911). 
The major grain production areas of Andalucía and both Castillas show very low 
densities of credit cooperatives, though for different reasons: The former represented 
predominantly large estates in the countryside around Guadalquivir, with the capacity to 
obtain finance in the urban financial markets and use commercial credit. In the case of 
Castilla-León we find a mass of small “poor”27 landowners with little capacity to form 
sustainable rural credit cooperatives, given their limited capacity to save and therefore 
to capitalize such institutions. The territorial patterns of Andalucía also apply in the case 
of Castilla- La Mancha. 
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II. THE FINANCIAL OPERATIONS OF CREDIT COOPERATIVES AND 
THEIR LIMITATIONS. 
 
In the most recent literature on rural finance, agricultural credit institutions28 are 
defined as institutions with a member base sharing one common characteristic: 
members have a responsibility to own, manage and direct the institution, while at the 
same time being the main, if not only, clients. These features were already developed in 
the microcredit institutions that had been successfully established in Germany after 
1850. The foundation of these cooperatives began after the last decade of the nineteenth 
century under the heading of "rural savings banks", to which is often added other words 
like "savings and loan" or "savings, loan and relief". The profile of these institutions 
was fully defined after 1915, forming different types (pure Raiffeisen system, mixed 
Raiffeisen system, with savings bank operations, etc.). It is difficult to specify an exact 
taxonomy, although one can see three main groups: pure Raiffeisen, primarily the Rural 
savings banks founded by the Catholic-agricultural organizations; mixed Raiffeisen, 
such as the rural savings banks of Badajoz, which include rules in their operating 
budgets extracted from the urban Savings Banks and German Haas cooperatives; and 
those with financial operations identical to those of savings banks, for example, the 
Savings and Loan Banks Artá (Baleares); Carlet (Valencia); Lora River (Sevilla); 
Antequera (Málaga, etc.. 
The foundation and legal recognition of rural savings banks was a slow and 
arduous process, aside from having to have statutes and regulations approved by the 
corresponding Civil Government and also having to be approved by the Ministries of 
Public Works and the Treasury. The final registration at the latter could take between 
two and five years, which imposed a substantial obstacle from above, because without 
this requisite they could not enjoy the tax levy provided for in the 1906 Act, and were 
also not eligible for soft loans from the Bank of Spain. This situation resulted in the 
disappearance of many institutions. 
Those in positions of management in this type of cooperative were honorary and 
non-remunerated, and, in general, held their positions for two years, although there was 
the possibility of re-election. Issues of relevance were addressed by general member 
meetings, in which agreements were made by a majority; in the event of a tie, the 
president had the casting vote; matters were discussed in turns, with a maximum of 
three arguments for and three against, in keeping with the "rules prescribed by courtesy, 
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decency and the good name of the society"29. Financial management was also a source 
of sustainability problems for the institutions; poor preparation of managers, mostly 
farmers, forced them to recruit professionals to overtake accounting tasks (director, 
treasurer, officers, etc.) in function of their economic capacity. The capacity to control 
and supervise these tasks became another problem, which in other countries with more 
developed cooperative systems were occupied by second-level organizations. The 
absence of this model of intervention posed a threat to the survival of the institutions, 
given the possibility of fraud and embezzlement on the part of managers. 
Spanish credit cooperatives operated under varying degrees of formality; some 
were highly formal, others worked almost informally (credit sections from agricultural 
unions). The majority were linked to formal finance and were even regulated and 
supervized by specialized federations (e.g. Catholic agricultural rural savings banks 
from Murcia, Navarra, Valencia, Cantabria, etc..). One of the key elements for their 
success in Germany30 rested in their ability to generate second-level financial 
organizations that channeled funds (exogenous and endogenous), technical assistance 
and supervision to local institutions, even coming together to form higher organizations 
(cooperative banks) that attended financially to the whole network. In the case of Spain, 
rural savings banks as a whole did not develop such supra-institutional organizations. In 
some cases institutions with Raiffeisen orientations founded by Social Catholicism 
came to develop regional second-level institutions, overtaking the functions of business 
coordination, cooperative network finance and social assistance services (buying land 
for their clients). The regional second levels failed to develop successful loan funds to 
meet the needs of their local rural savings banks and to exercise oversight functions and 
technical support. 
The 500 cooperatives in operation between 1915 and 1924 with around 50,000 
members (Table 3) reached an aggregate capital stock of 192 million pesetas in the final 
year of the period. This figure shows that the average capital stock of rural savings 
banks was 3,328 pesetas, and displays the low capitalization of such entities, given that 
this was the amount from which they sought funding in the urban financial markets. 
These figures have exceptions; in Badajoz, rural savings banks had an average capital 
stock of 2.1 million pesetas, a result of having a high number of medium and large 
landowners among their members. The variety of entities was large, and thus produced 
a correspondingly great diversity of financial functions. Overall, credit cooperatives 
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were less adopted in Spain than in the countries of Northwest Europe, and even in Italy 
in 1935 there were 2,066 “Casse Rurali”31 as compared with 646 in Spain. 
 
TABLE 3. CREDIT COOPERATIVES: THE “RURAL SAVINGS BANKS” 1915-
1933 
 
Loans (pesetas) Institutions Providing Funds (pesetas) Nr. Cajas 
Rurales 
Nr. 
Members 
Capital 
Stock 
(pesetas) 
Investment 
in Public 
Funds 
(pesetas) 
Deposits 
(pesetas) Personal Secured mortages Mortgages Total 
Bank of 
Spain 
Other 
Organizations 
525 53.063 164.798.300 1.234.761 10.324.218 6.555.296 418.667 8.089.072 15.063.035 6.718.576  
496 42.279 139.786.212 2.132.282 10.763.496 6.587.048 697.124 6.831.867 14.116.039 3.143.578 1.835.431 
503 51.502 146.314.437 2.038.156 11.631.266 8.317.052 713.316 6.882.146 15.912.514 3.427.278 2.163.997 
514 55.804 150.307.740 2.372.723 12.393.723 8.943.424 799.081 6.926.146 16.686.651 3.494.278 2.735.365 
501 57.965 192.889.062 9.913.189 18.265.136 9.808.174 2.428.712 8.144.507 20.381.393 5.527.679 2.639.161 
646 163.963   132.861.937    84.646.427   
 
Source: Anuario Estadístico de España 1915; 1916; 1924, Madrid; and DIRECCIÓN GENERAL DE AGRICULTURA: Acción 
social. Memoria descriptivo-estadística social agraria de las entidades agrícolas y pecuarias en 1º de enero de 1918, Madrid; 
Censo estadístico de Sindicatos Agrícolas y Comunidades de Labradores, Madrid, 1934. 
  
In 1917 the Catholic agricultural cooperatives were reorganized with the 
founding of the Confederación Católico Nacional Agraria (Catholic National Agrarian 
Confederation) from thirteen existing regional federations32. This supra-organization 
attained a high degree of corporate development (Table 4), but was also unable to solve 
the problems of financial assistance from its constituent credit cooperatives; even in the 
discourse of its directors33 the economic plan was subordinated to social and political 
control of the small Spanish peasantry. 
 
TABLE 4. - COMPOSITION OF THE C.N.C.A. 1917-1935 
 
  Cooperatives  Members Federations
1924 1,331 135,474 13 
1929 2,276   
1933 1,902 253,428 38 
1935 1,869 180,555  
 
Source: for 1924: MUÑIZ, Lorenzo (1924): La acción social agraria en 
España y memoria estadística de las entidades agrícolas y pecuarias en 1º de 
diciembre de 1924, Madrid; for 1929; Anuario Social de España, 1929, pp. 
380-382; for 1933: Revista Social Agraria, March, 1934, p. 64; 1935: 
Revista Social Agraria, March, 1936, p. 145. 
 
In 1902 the Catholic social corporations founded the Banco Popular de León 
XIII (People’s Bank of Leon XIII) as a corporation seated in Madrid. It was the first 
attempt to generate a financial institution to serve as an investor in start-up cooperatives. 
The initiative failed to take off, and its actions were rather limited; between 1905 and 
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1911 it only granted loans to 106 rural savings banks and agricultural unions. Its total 
loans between 1905 and 1921 were valued at 17.2 million pesetas34. 
Some years later, the CNCA founded its own financial institution by the name of 
the Caja de Crédito Confederal (Confederate Bank of Credit) (1917), with the aim of 
providing financial support to rural savings banks, but it failed quickly due to its 
inability to attract exogenous financing and the low level of collaboration on the part of 
federated institutions. In 1918 the strategy of the CNCA turned, looking for an 
agreement with a private institution, the Banco Agrícola Comercial (Agricultural 
Commerce Bank), which issued shares at the value of 40 million pesetas in 1919, but 
also never achieved fruition due its failure to adapt the bank to the special 
characteristics and needs of the agricultural cooperatives. Finally, the CNCA 
transformed its acquisition and commercial section in 1920 into the Banco Rural (Rural 
Bank)35, although this entity failed to take off, representing yet another failure. 
Overall, the contribution made by second-level financial institutions to the 
development of microfinance was quite modest. The problem lay with their inability to 
attract exogenous capital and act as wholesalers for rural savings banks. The main 
problem arose from conflicts of interest that occurred when these institutions were 
designed to simultaneously act as financers and capacity builders for the rural finance 
sector, inherently blocking the ability to play both roles with equal efficiency. 
Typically credit cooperatives set an equity and/or capital quota in obligatory 
shares or savings for all members, in contrast with the German Raiffeisen model. 
Additionally, some offered the possibility of voluntary savings, functioning as savings 
banks, although most were formed with the hope of attracting external resources. There 
is little statistical information on external financing of the banks and less on the 
federations, for which reason reproducing the case of the Caja Federal de Ahorro y 
Crédito (Federal Savings and Loan Bank) from the Federación Católico-Agrícola de 
Murcia (Catholic Agricultural Federation of Murcia) is pertinent (Table 5) in order to 
inspect how some of these second-level organizations managed to receive funds from 
different instances of the financial system (private banks, public credit institutions, and 
even international trading houses engaged in the purchase of crops). These funds were 
used primarily to finance their business networks, and in much less measure, to provide 
capital and advice to local rural savings banks. 
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 TABLE 5. SOURCES OF EXTERNAL FINANCING OF THE CAJA FEDERAL DE AHORRO 
Y CRÉDITO AND OF LA FEDERACIÓN CATÓLICO-AGRÍCOLA OF MURCIA36 (1917-1925) 
 
 
 
 
Source: Calculations based on las Memorias Anuales de la FCMA (Madrid) for each year. 
 
 
As noted above, rural non-denominational banks were also developed- some 
linked to agricultural unions with Republican-reformist orientations and others of a 
more “neutral” nature. Some were joined with agricultural federations, such as the 
Federación Agraria de las Provincias de Levante (The Agricultural Federation of the 
Mediterranean Coastal Provinces, Federación Valenciana de Sindicatos Agrícolas (the 
Valencian Federation of Agricultural Unions) or those existing in Asturias. Most of 
them had no direct financial support from these second-level organizations and operated 
without the control or advice from such institutions. The triangle formed by 
savings/credit, fertilizer and farming implements constituted the basis of their 
operations37 and formed part of the Republican reform program destined for small 
producers in competition with the Catholic organizations also struggling to attract these 
agricultural sectors. A differing characteristic of the non-denominational rural savings 
banks was that they seldom tried to adopt the Raiffeissen system of “unlimited” member 
liability, but rather operated internally according to the Haas model, which was adopted 
for the first time by Francisco Rivas Moreno38 in 1901 with the founding of the Caja 
Rural de Ahorros y Préstamos de Alhama de Murcia (Alhama Rural Savings and Loan 
Bank of Murcia). These cooperatives also adopted the operational framework of 
conventional savings banks. 
In Spain the potential market for microfinance was quite broad, given the high 
demand arising out of the agricultural transformations sparked by the end-of-century 
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crisis and the strategy of specialized production adopted to overcome it. The availability 
of financial technology to rural savings banks depended on their members’ level of 
income, as demonstrated by the Raiffeisen-oriented institutions of Navarra, the mixed 
nature of Badajoz39, or those functioning as savings banks, such as Mediterranean 
coastal regions of Murcia, Alicante and Valencia40. 
The financial functioning of the rural savings banks that achieved sustainability 
across this period of years was grounded on a series of premises: (1) populations in rural 
areas eligible for financial services were involved by institutions efficient in risk 
management, which thus obtained accurate information on the economic and even 
moral state of their clientele. (2) Cooperatives generally offered specialized financial 
products and services adapted to the conditions of the rural areas where they operated. 
(3) The granting of loans was at the center of their interventions, and the repayment 
pattern generally matched the local production rhythm and thus the timing of rural 
family income. (4) In order to achieve a greater impact on the economy of their 
members, entities continuously sought to maximize coverage and achieve sustainability. 
(5) The best cooperatives maintained a process of continued technical improvement, at 
the same time improving their own governance. 
The most established and successful banks effectively managed flexible 
strategies of capital disbursement and repayment schedules, in keeping with the 
predominant crops to be found within their territorial zone of operation, a flexibility that 
often entailed an increased risk of default and posed serious challenges for liquidity 
management. 
Credit cooperatives sought to diversify their portfolios and thus to reduce risk by 
including a wide variety of rural and agricultural clients: landowners, tenants and 
settlers, craftsmen, and free professionals such as veterinarians, doctors, lawyers, 
pharmacists and even agricultural wage laborers. The most successful, those reaching 
the greatest sustainability and coverage, were those managing to implicate a wide range 
of rural clients and not rely exclusively on those in the agricultural sector. Risk 
management was key to the development of financial markets41. Excessive risk reduced 
both the supply and demand of rural financial services. An essential characteristic of 
economic behavior in rural areas is the influence of risk on decisions42. 
The elevated risks ranged from diseases (virtually nonexistent health 
infrastructure) to income volatility of family farms, aside from the inherent fickleness of 
agriculture. These risks discouraged lenders, who feared loss due to default payments. 
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Wherever insurance and other market risk management mechanisms failed, informal 
institutions surged forth to fill the void43, which is attested to by those institutions that 
emerged in the in the farming cities of the Mediterranean coastal regions of Spain. The 
agricultural union of Yecla, which counted with a credit section, according to figures 
from the Memoria Anual de la FCMA (Annual Report of the FCMA), counted 1,932 
members of which 70.1% were land-owning farmers, 11.7% large landowners, 7.4% 
tenants, 2.3% farm laborers, and the remaining 8.5% was made up of small artisans and 
free professionals44. 
The establishment of associations and alliances with other institutions45, which 
ultimately set some of these credit cooperatives in motion, extended their financial 
coverage and lowered the cost of providing services. The most successful rural savings 
banks came to offer additional financial products beyond credit in order to achieve 
sustainability, offering access to savings deposits, the sale of inputs on credit, insurance, 
the purchase of machinery, etc.. 
Non Raiffeisen-oriented banks did not grant loans according to specific 
predefined ends, but rather based them on the individual details and case-study of the 
client, offering flexible terms adjusted to household income flows, and demanding at 
the same time greater borrower equity to reduce delinquencies. Catholic Raiffeisen 
banks, such as those of Navarra, Burgos or Palencia, operated with greater liquidity and 
granted loans for purposes specified by the institution and whose execution institutional 
directors could oversee. Contract terms were based on the “unlimited liability” of all 
members, and repayment also entailed member scrutiny. The charter of the Caja Rural 
de Olite (Rural Savings Bank of Olite), one of the most successful of Navarra, reflects 
these ideas directly in its bylaws46. 
The most successful Spanish credit cooperatives (Rural savings banks of Extremadura, 
Navarra, Murcia, etc.) implemented new techniques to more cost-effectively lend and 
attract deposits, and thereby succeeded in expanding the wide offering of financial 
services produced for broad segments of the rural population in their regions, the costs 
and risks of which were agreeable for both members and the institutions themselves. 
These organizations possessed the necessary resources (human capital, leadership, 
network connections, information capital and access to exogenous funds) and 
implemented financial functions suitable for their market segment. 
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 III. THE DUALITY OF RURAL MICROFINANCE IN SPAIN: NEW 
AND OLD INSTITUTIONS. 
 
Rural savings banks are a novel type of microcredit institution that, since the late 
nineteenth century, have been dedicated to the development or the implementation of 
microfinance in rural Spain. In this sector there operated not only newly coined 
institutions, but also other publicly owned institutions from the Ancien Régime: we 
refer to the pósitos (public granaries). Economically speaking, the pósitos were a way of 
combating the subsistence crisis of the Ancien Regime; they also tried to control the 
movement of grain prices until the end of the eighteenth century, and later directed 
themselves toward agricultural credit, attempting to hold back the development of 
informal credit markets in the fields. On some occasions they acted as an efficient 
means to save part of the grain production, at least for some small producers, and in this 
regard constituted a prototype of the autarchic circuit, closed and local, of agriculture 
and the grain trade until the end of the eighteenth century. 
During the first half of the nineteenth century, these institutions lived in 
administrative chaos due to the withdraw of State-exercised control, the use of their 
funds to support a deteriorating network of public services, and the views of liberal 
authorities, who did not see a place for these institutions in new administration, shelving 
them aside as anachronistic entities, while at the same time acknowledging their utility 
in some moments and their popular rooting in a context of slow transformation in rural 
economic structures. In the second half of this century, the institutions were effectively 
controlled and regulated for some time, which facilitated their recovery. When later 
their administration was decentralized into the municipal hands, their funds were, in 
many cases, made use of by local oligarchies. The Ley de 1906 de Pósitos (1906 
Granaries Act) gave these institutions a definite reorientation toward microcredit. 
Pósitos and rural savings banks thus coincided both spatially and temporally, acting in 
the rural finance market. 
The pósitos formed an imperfect network controlled by the State, although 
without developing horizontal links between units at the same level. In contrast, rural 
savings banks never came to constitute collaborative networks, save for the very few 
cases already described above. Around 3,500 pósitos were spread throughout the 
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country during the years covered by this study, compared to 646 agricultural credit 
cooperatives, which was the peak reached in 1934. The ability to offer financial 
services, primarily loans, to poor rural clientele was much greater in the case of pósitos. 
 
 
CHART 2. LENT CAPITAL FOR PÓSITOS AND RURAL SAVINGS BANKS 
1915-1934(constant 1935 pesetas) 
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Source: MARTÍNEZ SOTO, AP.: “Los pósitos en el siglo XIX: una red pública de microcrédito agrario 
(1800-1914), Historia Agraria (Murcia), 43, 2007, pp. 485-530/ 33 
 
The trend in the volume of lent capital from pósitos and rural savings banks 
tended to converge between 1915 and 1933, although the pósitos always had a higher 
volume of credit transactions. The authorities on which the pósitos depended tried in 
distinct moments to make them into rural savings banks or else to modify their 
functioning along such lines47. The Delegation Regia de Pósitos (Royal Pósito Office) 
tried to establish a second-level institution, such as the Pósito Nacional Alfonso XIII in 
1920, to the end of facilitating this transformation. 
  
CONCLUSIONS 
 
Agricultural cooperatives in Spain emerged in the late nineteenth century, 
significantly later than in the rest of Western Europe. The diffusion of doctrine and 
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models by the most prominent publicists, Díaz de Rábago, Chaves, Rivas Moreno, did 
not produce the necessary echo among agricultural groups and associations that could 
have introduced these institutions of moral microcredit. Theories and the first 
foundations arrived in the height of the late-century crisis that severely affected the 
agriculture sector, making difficult the further establishment of such organizations 
meant to finance the poorest peasants. 
The momentum to found such credit institutions arose from two different 
directions. On the one hand emerged social-Catholic corporations driven by their own 
internal hierarchy. These cases tried to transplant the Raiffeisen model directly and 
without changes to Spain’s different agricultural contexts, without taking into account 
considerations relating to the impact that this model could cause among a portion of the 
agricultural landowners related with the Catholic movement. The implantation was 
quite successful in areas like Navarra, Rioja, Murcia and Cantabria and where 
agricultural specialization had come to develop a clear mercantile and export focus, 
which provided regular income to owners and tenants. By contrast, they failed in the 
grain areas of Castilla-León, where the “poorest landowners” dominated, in the large 
landholder areas of Andalucía and Castilla-La Mancha, where owners had access to 
other channels of financing (private banking, Banco Hipotecario de España (Mortgage 
Bank of Spain), etc.), and in the smallholder countryside of Galicia. 
Catholic cooperativism developed a powerful confederate organization, the 
Confederación Nacional Católica- Agrícola (CNCA), (National Confederation 
Catholic-Agricultural), but this was unable to construct a second-level financial network 
to capture exogenous funds, redistribute them to regional federations, provide technical 
training in finance and oversee the management their affiliated credit cooperatives. 
Catholics launched various initiatives, all of which failed (Caja Confederal, Banco 
Rural, and so on.). The CNCA was too concerned with political and ideological matters 
related with the social control of small peasantry before socialism to develop an 
appropriate financial structure. In this way, we can speak of failure in terms of the 
attempt by Catholics transplant Raiffeisen model in rural areas. 
Also early launched were other initiatives of a secular nature to found 
cooperative institutions. The characteristics of this other group are: (1) greater doctrinal 
flexibility in designing the cooperative model in keeping with German Haas 
cooperativism; (2) greater openness to different types of rural clientele; (3) the absence 
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of any kind federal second-level structure, and thus greater isolation; (4) and, finally, a 
varied offering of products and services. 
Since 1901 the model devised by Francisco Rivas Moreno the rural savings and 
loan bank was increasingly stressed, fusing together in its organization the principles of 
Raiffeisen cooperativism and of the Schulze-Delitzsch people’s banks along the same 
lines as the previously cited Haas cooperatives. Many agricultural groups adopted this 
type of cooperative, although without forming linkages amongst themselves, instead 
acting in a reduced local ambit that they could control (information capital). Other 
cooperatives in this vein also adopted several of the operational characteristics of 
savings banks. 
An analysis of the density of agricultural credit cooperativism has permitted the 
demonstration of their stronger presence in Navarra, Rioja, Cantabria, Tarragona, 
Balearic Islands, Murcia and Valencia than in the rest of the country, specifically in the 
territories in which agricultural changes were linked to the specialization in production 
destined to the most active national markets, export and industry. In these places, the 
rural population was able to access microfinance services stimulated by credit 
cooperatives with relative ease. 
Spain had already counted with institutions that practicing rural microcredit 
since the end of the eighteenth century: we refer to the privately founded municipal 
pósitos with broad coverage across the country. These institutions experienced a deep 
restructuring with the Ley de 1906 de Pósitos (1906 Granaries Act), passing under the 
control and supervision of a state body (Dirección Regia de Pósitos) and turning their 
orientation almost completely towards microcredit. This same act foresaw the 
possibility of converting them into rural savings banks or else of patterning them after 
this institutional model, offering them low-cost loans (4-5% interest rates). Throughout 
the first third of the twentieth century the pósitos improved their operations and played 
a relatively important role in rural microfinance. A comparison of the lending activity of 
rural savings banks with that of pósitos found the later to have a stronger presence in 
rural microfinance, especially with respect to credit. 
 In general, we have shown how the establishment of agricultural credit 
cooperatives did not enjoy the same generalized success in Spain, as was the case in 
other European countries48. In those regions where credit cooperatives achieved high 
levels of sustainability and coverage, they became a useful instrument to counter the 
financial exclusion of the poorest rural populations. Their microcredit offering was an 
effective aid for the survival of small family farms in increasingly competitive market 
conditions. In this context they reduced the potency of informal rural finance 
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mechanisms by offering products and services tailored to the demands of the rural 
clientele. 
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